Rebooting Originalism
Rebooting Originalism
Stephen M. Griffin, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1185 (2008)
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In this article, I provide a critique of the new originalism. It is worth noting that the objections presented here were advanced in the 1990s, but I will not belabor the point that new originalists might have overlooked earlier objections. The debates over methods of constitutional interpretation in the 1980s and 1990s were massively intricate, and it is reasonable that new originalists focus selectively on a few lines of argument. On the positive side, I provide a theory that, unlike originalism, is capable of explaining and justifying the persistence in the federal courts of alternative legitimate forms of constitutional interpretation and the reality and legitimacy of informal constitutional change.