Religious Music in Public Schools

Religious Music in Public Schools: The Disappointing Analysis in Stratechuk v. Board of Education, South Orange-Maplewood School District
Megan Knowlton, 10 Rutgers J. L. & Religion 17 (2009)

Religious music in a school’s December concert is an issue that affects children, parents and teachers alike. While many have strong feelings for or against the inclusion of religious and holiday music during the annual choir and instrumental concerts in America’s public schools, the legal contours of the issue are hazy at best. The District Court of New Jersey recently had an opportunity to address these issues head on in Stratechuk v. Board of Education, South Orange-Maplewood School District. Unfortunately, the District Court of New Jersey did not rise to the challenge and failed to give adequate attention to the complex and poignant legal issues in the case. Its analysis under the Establishment Clause blended the three distinct prongs of the Lemon test and gave too much weight to the school district’s legislative purpose while it deemphasized the factual context of the case and pertinent legal precedent. Most alarming, however, was the District Court’s unilateral conclusion of a genuine issue of material fact at the outset of its summary judgment discussion. These aspects of the District Court’s opinion give the impression that its examination was outcome determinative instead of based in sound legal analysis.

First, this article will analyze the District Court’s application of the summary judgment standard and whether its application was appropriate. Next, this article will address the District Court’s Establishment Clause analysis and examine the District Court’s findings on each prong of the Lemon test. This article will discuss the District Court’s use of precedent, its consideration of the factual context of the case and the basis for its conclusion. Finally, this article will resolve that the District Court’s application of the summary judgment standard and analysis under the Establishment Clause was deficient and the Third Circuit, on appeal, should reverse it.