International Delegations and the Values of Federalism
International Delegations and the Values of Federalism
Neil S. Siegel, 71-WTR Law & Contemp. Probs. 93 (2008)
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Putting aside for a moment the persuasiveness of this claim, it is plain that the theory and practice of federalism are relevant to analyzing the law and politics of international delegations, including their costs and benefits. American federalism endeavors to vindicate certain values by protecting the regulatory autonomy of U.S. states. International delegations pose a potential threat to these values by undermining state control: such delegations may cause international bodies or foreign nations to exercise authority that would otherwise be exercised by the states. Accordingly, it is worth thinking about the effects of international delegations on the values of federalism.
This inquiry conducts such an examination and concludes that the relationship between an international delegation and federalism values depends upon what would happen in the absence of the international delegation. When the delegation replaces regulation by the federal government that would have displaced state choices anyway, then the delegation has no effect on state regulatory control, but an uncertain net effect on federalism values. The impact turns on the relative inclinations of the federal government and the international body to decentralize.