Divided 8th Circuit upholds 121 month sentence for North Dakota mom who killed her day old infant

United States of America v. Deegan, No. 08-2299 (8th Cir. May 25, 2010) (Before COLLOTON, BRIGHT, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.)

Judge Colloton wrote for the majority joined by Judge Shepherd. Judge Bright dissented.

The majority and dissent disagreed about whether the crime should be treated as second-degree murder or manslaughter. They agreed that the defendant lived in a highly abusive and poverty stricken situation on the Indian reservation and had for most of her life. Judge Bright, the dissenting judge, emphasized another case in North Dakota state courts involving comparable facts which only resulted in probation for the defendant as opposed to the 121 months sentence imposed in this case.

Excerpts:
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COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Dana Deegan pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to second-degree murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 and 1153. The district court sentenced Deegan to 121 months’ imprisonment, which was the bottom of the advisory guideline range. Deegan appeals the sentence, and we affirm.

Deegan is a member of the Three Affiliated Tribes. On October 20, 1998, Deegan secretly gave birth to a baby boy in the bathroom of her home on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. The baby was alive and breathing when he was delivered. Deegan had kept her pregnancy hidden, and no other adult was present at the time of the delivery. Deegan’s three other minor children were in the home, but they were unaware of the birth. Approximately two hours after delivering her son, Deegan fed, cleaned, and dressed him, and then placed him in a basket. She then left the house with her three other children, intentionally leaving the baby alone without food, water, or a caregiver. Deegan did not return to her home for approximately two weeks. When she returned, she found the baby dead in the basket where she had left him. She put his remains in a suitcase, and deposited the suitcase in a rural ditch area near her residence.

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BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent.

This case concerns the crime of neonaticide, which is the killing of a newborn child on the first day of life. This crime is practically unknown in the federal courts. Neonaticide is a crime relating to family and domestic concerns and, thus, federal courts do not generally deal with these crimes. Indeed, excluding habeas cases, my research has disclosed only one other reported federal case discussing and deciding a neonaticide crime. See United States v. Tom, 494 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d and remanded to 327 F. App’x 93 (10th Cir. 2009).

In the view of this judge, the procedure followed and the imposition of a ten year plus prison sentence on Ms. Deegan, a young American Indian woman, represents the most clear sentencing error that this dissenting judge has ever seen.

A. Summary of Contentions

Ms. Deegan’s crime consisted of a special sort of homicide called “neonaticide,” well documented in medical and legal literature, which describes the conduct of a parent, ordinarily the mother, who is often suffering from depression or
other mental illness causing the death of an infant child within twenty-four hours of birth.

First, Ms. Deegan’s conduct as neonaticide does not now, nor has it ever, come within the “run-of-the-mine” guidelines for second-degree murder, the charge to which Ms. Deegan pleaded guilty. But the district court mistakenly believed that this
case fell within the second-degree murder guidelines. Thus, the sentence imposed was procedurally gross error.
Second, the district court presumed that the guidelines were reasonable. This
is plain error.

Third, because this case is outside the heartland of second-degree murder cases, the district court’s 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) analysis was flawed at its beginning, and this case required imposition of a sentence completely apart from the guidelines and under § 3553(a). This the district court did not do.

Fourth, analysis of the § 3553(a) factors demonstrates that Ms. Deegan’s sentence is substantively unreasonable. The district court’s approach to sentencing served to elevate a guidelines sentence above an individualized assessment of the facts and circumstances of this case. Each error compounded the next one and these mistakes require reversal and remand.

Finally, the failure to follow proper sentencing procedures and methodology led to a highly excessive sentence for Ms. Deegan. Her crime requires a different approach than taken by the district court and approved by the majority . . .